The 28 recommendations are summarised as follows:

RECOMMENDATION 1:Ministers should determine early in a pandemic how they will ensure that the response is proportionate to the perceived level of risk and how this will guide decision-making. This approach should be reflected in the revised pandemic-specific Concept of Operations by summer 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The Cabinet Office should enshrine the position of the four nations mechanism for certain types of emergencies in a revised Concept of Operations by summer 2011. The mechanism should then be included in the exercise programme for emergencies in a devolved matter.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The four health ministers should meet to discuss emergency preparedness (and a range of other issues) at least once a year. Officials should aim to meet face to face more regularly.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The Cabinet Office should review the technological support available for emergency ministerial and official
meetings, to ensure that those joining in meetings remotely can be engaged as fully as possible in the discussion.

RECOMMENDATION 5:Departments should consider how best to increase the resilience arrangements for key roles in an ongoing crisis
response, including those in charge of the response and committee members, and revise their resilience arrangements accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION 6: By December 2010:
(i) Ministers should decide the levels of deaths for which planning is appropriate as part of the process of revising Pandemic flu: A national framework for responding to an influenza pandemic.
(ii) The Home Office, working with others including the Ministry of Justice, the Department of Health, the Cabinet Office, Communities and Local Government and the devolved administrations, should ensure that plans are in place to deal with those levels of deaths during a pandemic, linking with other elements of mass fatality management and specifying clear responsibilities for the collection, transportation, storage and burial or cremation of bodies.

RECOMMENDATION 7: The Government Office for Science, working with lead government departments, should enable key ministers and senior officials to understand the strengths and limitations of likely available scientific advice as part of their general induction. This training should then be reinforced at the outbreak of any emergency.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The four Chief Medical Officers should jointly commission further work to support key decision-making early in a pandemic by January 2011. This should consider the practicalities of developing methods to measure the severity of a pandemic in its early stages. In particular, further exploration of population-based surveillance, such as serology, should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 9: The Government Chief Scientific Adviser and the Department of Health should ensure that there is an appropriate balance of contribution in the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies for future pandemic outbreaks.

RECOMMENDATION 10: The Cabinet Office, with the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) and the four Chief Medical Officers (CMOs), should devise a process through which UK government ministers and the devolved administrations are presented with a unified, rounded statement of scientific advice. This process should engage CMOs (or CSAs for other emergencies) and should be included in a revised Concept of Operations by summer 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 11: The Government Chief Scientific Adviser and UK health departments should convene a working group to review the calculation of planning scenarios and how they are used in public. This should report by April 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 12: The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation should report directly to the central emergency meetings in a future pandemic, although the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies should be used at the appropriate time to provide its challenge function. This should be clarified in a revised COBR Response Guide for Pandemic Influenza by summer 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 13: The Department of Health should build relationships between the Behaviour and Communication sub-group of the Scientific Pandemic Influenza Advisory Committee (SPI-B&C) and the Department of Health’s policy and communications teams so that the SPI-B&C’s expertise can be used in addition to in-house resources in planning for vaccine uptake and other relevant policy areas.

RECOMMENDATION 14:Any future Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies should adhere as closely as possible to the established
principles of scientific advice to government and should release its descriptive papers and forecasts (as distinct from any policy advice) at regular intervals. This should be clarified in a revised Concept of Operations by summer 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 15: The Government Chief Scientific Adviser should provide expert technical briefings to respected scientists not directly involved with the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies. This would enable a wider group of experts to comment in an informed manner on the government’s approach.

RECOMMENDATION 16: The Department of Health, working with others through the revision of the National Framework, should explore a more flexible, evidence-based approach to triggering actions during a pandemic than the current WHO phases and UK alert levels. In particular, this work should ensure that clear guidance is set out to enable the rapid adjustment of the prophylaxis policy as more is learned about the nature of the virus. Work to revise the National Framework should be concluded no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 17: The Department of Health, working with others through the revision of the National Framework, should ensure that there is an appropriate balance between local flexibility and UK-wide public confidence in the response. A national strategic approach can and should be compatible with increased subsidiarity and therefore increased variation according to circumstances; triggers agreed and understood on a UK-wide level could be applied flexibly in different geographical areas on the basis of local circumstances. This should be set out in the revised National Framework and published no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 18: The Department of Health and the devolved administrations should agree triggers responsive to the capacity of primary care in the activation and stand-down of the National Pandemic Flu Service at both national and regional levels. These triggers should be set out in the revised National Framework and published no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 19: The Department of Health should commission an independent evaluation of the National Pandemic Flu Service, covering value for money, risk analysis and any potential for wider application.

RECOMMENDATION 20: The four health departments should reflect on the proposals identified by the Swine Flu Critical Care Clinical Group and incorporate them, as appropriate, into the revised National Framework no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 21: The Department of Health should negotiate advance-purchase agreements that allow flexibility over the eventual quantities purchased.

RECOMMENDATION 22: The Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation should be asked to advise on vaccination strategies across a range of scenarios, including severe and less severe pandemic viruses. This advice should incorporate the views of behavioural scientists and economic analysis, and be published in the revised National Framework no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The four health ministers should commission officials to put in place arrangements to ensure the rapid implementation of a vaccination programme during a pandemic. For example, a sleeping contract with GPs and/or other willing providers could be negotiated.

RECOMMENDATION 24: The Department of Health and the devolved administrations should explore what more can be done to raise levels of public awareness and understanding about the key characteristics of a pandemic and the core response measures.

RECOMMENDATION 25: The four UK health departments should review their use of language during pandemics to ensure that it accurately conveys the aims of the response efforts and the levels of risk. In particular, the use of the terms ‘containment’ and ‘reasonable worst case’ should be reconsidered as they are easily misunderstood. The National Framework and communications strategies should be amended to reflect such revisions by no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 26: The four UK health departments should consider new ways of proactively engaging with both journalists and the public. These could include disseminating transcripts of media briefings, using podcasts and making more use of social networking and digital technology to reach specific sections of the public. The National Framework and communications strategies should be amended to reflect any changes no later than March 2011.

RECOMMENDATION 27: The Cabinet Office should ensure that the communications approach (weekly briefings, Q&A sessions, regular releases of facts and figures) adopted by the Department of Health and the devolved administrations is used, where appropriate, as a model of best practice for future emergency situations.

RECOMMENDATION 28: The Department of Health and the devolved administrations should discuss with professional health bodies how best to create sources of direct clinical advice for health professionals during a pandemic. This may be most appropriately hosted by one or more of the professional bodies.

Click here for the full pandemic review report.

GemaTech are exhibiting at the annual APA-ACPO police conference at Manchester Central on June 30th.

The conference line up includes speakers covering a range of topics including:

Information Systems Improvement Strategy (ISIS)
Sustainable social media: building for the long term
Supporting chief officers and police authorities using the OGC Gateway review process
Going for Gold: Police Procurement for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

For further information contact Karen Jones.

Copper theft has risen over recent years as the price for the metal has inflated. Whereas for consumers the lack of phone and braodband is a frustrating inconvenience, loss of these services for businesses, particularly SME or businesses which are run from homes, can be a business continuity nightmare.

When copper was stolen from the Thames Ditton area in March, Colin Spencer-Townson, who runs the CTC Professional Systems business from his home in the Woodlands, Esher, said the past week without internet access had been “hell”.

He said: “My business has been seriously affected by this. We run an email service and we had to rush it to another location. It’s been very difficult.

“I’ve definitely lost business from this. I’m trying to get compensation, but I doubt I’ll get any. With the amount of times these things have happened this year, I’m surprised BT haven’t got their act together to deal promptly with these incidents.”

Too many businesses think that they are subject to the time it takes for BT to rectify the situation, however there are a number of telecoms continuity solutions which can ensure resilience against such an event.

Business Continuity managers should be challenging their IT and Telecoms managers on what exactly they have in place to combat copper theft. This crime is easy to commit as the cables run a mere 6 inches under the ground between the local serving exchange and office buildings. Coupled with the demand for copper, the probability of it happening to your business is getting higher. Has it affected you yet?

Too often IT and Telecoms are taken for granted as every business relies on them for successful operation and revenue generation, but we need to be realistic about their vulnerability, which can be exposed by a variety of business disruptions including copper theft, careless roadworks, flooded switches, power cuts and access of denial into a building.

A recent survey by government publication Municipal Year Book (MYB), found that the majority of local council CEOs rated efficiency as the top priority for the next five years, followed by service rationalisation, economic regeneration and then shared services.

But it appears that councils are a little disjointed when it comes to making efficiency decisions…

For example, one local council recently decided to terminate a radio comms contract for its mobile traffic/ parking officers with a view to replacing it with a more efficient mobile gsm contract. Whilst the first contract was happily terminated, the proposal for the mobile contract was rejected, leaving the council employees with no means of mobile communication!

GemaTech’s own experience also highlights the issue. A one hour’s meeting with a particular council highlighted the amount of money currently wasted on unused telephone circuits. GemaTech quoted for a contract to supply telecoms recovery costing the council £24,000 which would also save the council around £38,000 a year.

Sometimes you need to change suppliers or contracts to achieve the desired efficiencies, and therefore councils need to have the procurement structure in place to enable this to happen, otherwise they are going to risk losing essential services or making do with inefficient suppliers and services.

The FSA is set to launch its own investigation into Goldman Sachs with regards to the transaction known as Abacus 2007-AC1 undertaken 3 years ago.

Goldman Sachs have stressed that it had lost $90m on the transaction and insisted that its actions were “entirely appropriate”.

The truth will only be found in documentation recorded during the time of the transaction. In the US regulation states that all voice and data communications are to be recorded including emails, IM messages and SMS texts.

As regulation stands in the UK, only landline conversations referring to transactions are required to be recorded and stored which may make the FSA’s task more difficult.

If after the currently imposed 3 month consultation period the FSA decides to remove the current exemption clause to regulation, financial institutions such as Goldman Sachs will have no choice but to include mobile voice and data recording in the UK.

It will be very interesting to see how the US and UK investigations compare…

Telephone system hacking is a particular problem for the UK and can have considerable financial consequences for victims, contributing to the $80 billion cost caused by this kind of fraud, globally. Hackers are apparently finding it even easier to get into organisation’s PBXs in order to make international calls which are then invoiced to the organisation rather than the hacker.

Indeed one of GemaTech’s customers experienced such a fraud at the back end of last year. Luckily they had our voice recording solution which recorded vital information contained in a conversation. This information was subsequently used to help close the loop on the hacker and stop the fraud in its tracks, potentially saving the company thousands of pounds.

While it is thoroughly recommended that companies deploy a PBX firewall, a voice recording solution can in some cases help identify the hacker, or how they have got through, should they manage to bypass the firewall.

1. Ensure that you have a secure PBX firewall installed. Companies such as Nimans and Rocom claim to be at the forefront of developing such solutions to contain outbreaks of phone hacking in the UK.

2. Ensure that voicemail boxes and PBXs are protected with PIN numbers which are changed regularly. Any voicemail boxes not in use should be de-activated from the system.

3. Install voice recording on all incoming and outgoing phone calls. This way if anyone does hack in you have a chance of finding out how they may have done it.

4. Make sure you know and understand all the functionality of your PBX and block any unecessary access e.g. if one extension does not need to mkae mobile or international calls, ensure that the access is blocked.

5. Make sure you always monitor (or disable if not needed) DISA – Direct Inwards System Access.

Each European Country included in the EEA is summarised in terms of regulation requirements and length of time in which to introduce those particular requirements.

This consultation comes hot on the heels of the UK’s FSA consultation which came out a month ago and it strikes me that, like it or loathe it, more stringent regulation is coming across the continent, and maybe even further afield (the U.S. already have regulation in place) to ensure that all communications for both voice and data made from a mobile phone within the financial sector (including smartphones, iPhones and Blackberry smartphones) will have to be recorded and stored for a certain amount of time.

They key paragraph relating to the proposed regulation is as follows:

Mobiles and electronic communications
44. The recording requirements currently imposed by Member States with regard to recording mobile conversations appear to fall into two broad categories (Annex 2). Firstly, the majority of Member States who currently impose the broadest level of telephone recording obligations also require that mobile phones be recorded where client orders are received this way. Secondly, a number of Member States either; require traders to apply for special authorisation to trade via a mobile phone; prohibit the reception by traders of orders via mobile phone outside of a company mobile phone; or allow a special recording exemption to client orders received on a mobile phone. In Germany, most investment firms prohibit traders to trade via mobile phone. The UK FSA is currently consulting on removing its current exemption for conversations on mobile phones. CESR believes that a recording requirement should be technology neutral and apply to all ways of making/receiving telephone calls and electronic communications.

Feel free to contact me for further information.

It now appears that the flood is likely to have been caused by some faulty works undertaken by a water company on the water main which runs underneath the exchange. The fault alledgedly only became apparent when the water was turned back on, as thousands of gallons water leaked out of the main water pipe and into the lower floor of the exchange building.

The flood caused the mains electricity, and most probably the UPS, to fail in addition to sparking a fire. Generators have been brought in to power the switching equipment. Fortunately it appears that no telecoms equipment has been damaged by the flood or fire.

It does beg the question as to how the water from a supposedly burst pipe was able to penetrate the walls of the basement. Was it caused by holes in the wall or simply the force of the water pushing through?

If you know any more than I do it would be great if you could share your info.

A lot of the switching equipment is stored in the basement of the exchange. The building, like many others in London, has lower floors which sit below the water line. Pumps are installed so that should any of the water leak into the base of the building, the pump automatically kicks in to get the water out. This obviously didn’t happen in the case of Paddington North yesterday, either because the pump was faulty or there was a more major kind of water leak.

The water then caused a fire as it mixed with electrical equipment. Firefighters would then have had to put out the flames with more water, in turn exacerbating the situation.

My advice for any organisation in light of this event, would be a) have some kind of telecoms contingency plan in place b) check whether your telecoms equipment sits in a basement or floor situated below water mains and understand the flood risks associated with it.